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Myth-Science and the Fictioning of Reality
In what follows I put forward an idea of contemporary art practice as a form of myth-science, 
itself defined as a kind of fictioning of reality.1 Most of what follows has been developed in 
relation to the collaborative ‘performance fiction’ Plastique Fantastique (and especially in 
conversation with David Burrows) and thus, in acknowledgement of this parallel research 
programme, interspersed throughout the text are images from our practice and, in particular, 
a performance itself titled ‘Myth-Science’. 2 I hope that this local ‘scene’ might resonate on a 
more global level, but also that my comments will not be read as being solely tethered to this 
particular collaboration (indeed, my article intends the mapping of a more general trajectory 
in art). The article ends with a brief Coda on Felix Guattari’s concept – from Schizoanalytic 
Cartographies – of ‘fabulous images’ that offers another inflection on my theme.
…theres some thing in us it dont have no name...it aint us but yet its in us... 
(Russell Hoban, Riddly Walker)
1. Introduction: Art and the World 
   (or, that which is in the world but not of the world)
When art engages directly with the world as-it-is it already surrenders some of its 
power. It has to use more or less recognizable forms, languages, narratives – even if 
these are idiosyncratic and/or marginal in nature. Another way of saying this is that 
such art is both of and for the world in which it is situated – or, which amounts to the 
same thing, it already has its audience in place. Jean-François Lyotard says as much 
in his claim that art can simply ‘multiply the fantasies of realism’ rather than, pre-
cisely, disrupting them (which, in Lyotard’s view, is art’s true avant-garde function) 
(Lyotard 1984, 74). Another way of putting this is that art does not necessarily offer a 
reassuring image of and to a subjectivity already in place (although it may of course 
operate in this manner).
1	 The	 article	 draws	 on	 and	 develops	 ideas	first	 put	 forward	 in	O’Sullivan	 2014.	The	 term	myth- 
 science is borrowed from Sun Ra and Afrofuturism more generally (see Kodwo Eshun’s discussion, 
	 “Synthesizing	the	Omniverse”,	in	Eshun	1998,	154-163).	The	artist	Mike	Kelley,	in	an	essay	on	Olaf	 
	 Fahlstrom	(Kelley	1995),	links	the	term	more	particularly	to	expanded	contemporary	art	practice.
2	 “Myth-Science”	was	performed	in	2014	at	the	“Webewoche”	exhibition/event,	Stroom	den	Haag,	 
	 The	Hague	and	at	the	“Schizo-Culture”	exhibition/event,	Space	Gallery,	London	(see	http://www. 
	 plastiquefantastique.org/performance25.html).	Plastique	Fantastique,	for	this	performance,	invol- 
	 ved	myself	and	Burrows	alongside	Alex	Marzeta	and	Harriet	Skully.
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In	 its	 engaged	 and	 oppositional	 form	–	 institutional	 critique,	 for	 example	 –	 such	
art is still about the world. Indeed, the more engaged it is, the more it must mirror, 
however critically (or negatively), its object. Such critique, again as Lyotard once 
remarked,	is	trapped	by	its	target,	towards	which	it	must,	to	some	extent,	adjust	itself	
in order to engage. This kind of ‘critical’ art practice can operate as a kind of me-
lancholic echo chamber in this sense (we might say that this is also the limitation of 
understanding art more generally as a form of ideology critique).
The	so-called	‘archival	turn’	within	contemporary	art	would	be	a	softer	example	
of this logic. Here, art practice becomes an archiving gesture, a framing and presen-
ting	of	a	subset	of	the	world.	An	archive	practice	is	first	and	foremost	curatorial	in	
this sense; it gathers together hitherto separate elements under a banner (a concept, 
a theme, a name, and so on), but, crucially, it does not necessarily transform these 
elements. Indeed, ultimately it offers nothing more than a product (or a series of 
products) designed to meet the desire for knowledge – when the latter is understood 
as knowledge of the world as-it-is.
As has often been pointed out, the ‘Art World’ is insatiable in this respect; it 
requires evermore banners just as it creates ever more artist-archivist-curators (or, 
simply, new products and new consumers). Novelty here consists of new groupings 
of the what-already-is, the trumping of one set of knowledges with another, the iden-
tification	of	counter	or	dissonant	knowledges	(that	nevertheless	operate	on	the	same	
register of typical ‘meaning’). Indeed, knowledge becomes the currency of such 
practices (knowledge is power as the saying goes – at least power of a worldly kind).
On	the	other	hand,	can	art	ever	be	anything	but	the	presentation	of	a	subset	of	the	
world,	seeing	as	it	is	a	practice	that	takes	place	in	that	very	world?	Here,	the	defini- 
tion	of	a	world	–	what	it	includes	and	what	it	excludes	–	is	crucial	insofar	as	we	might	
make	the	tentative	claim	that	art	can	be	specifically	other-worldly	without	meaning	
it is somehow outside the world as-it-is (indeed, how could it be?). In fact, an art 
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practice that attempts to operate completely divorced from the world – understood 
here as our dominant contemporary conditions – runs the risk of irrelevance, esca-
pism or simply being a sophisticated form of withdrawal.
Nevertheless, it is certainly the case that art’s ‘materials’ are not simply of the 
world as constituted. As such, it follows that its audience – an audience adequate and 
appropriate to it – is not always already in place. Art, in this sense, can be understood 
as untimely, or as in time, but also out of time. It is, as it were, future-orientated. 
Gilles	Deleuze’s	writings	on	art	foreground	this	strange	temporality	of	art	–	that	“its	
people	are	missing”	(Deleuze	1989,	208-211),	or,	more	prophetically,	yet-to-come.	
Art	draws	something	forth	from	already	existing	subjectivities	in	this	sense.
But	how	might	this	untimeliness	manifest	itself?	What	form	might	it	take?	One	
thing	is	clear:	it	will	not	be	easy	to	understand.	If	it	is	a	communication,	it	will	be	one	
without meaning (to paraphrase Lyotard once more), when meaning is understood 
as a register of knowledge – or, to introduce another term, as part of the code of the 
world as-it-is. Hence the important idea that something might be of the world but 
not of the (dominant) code of that world (might, in this sense, be occult). This might 
mean that such practices – that communicate without meaning – are not taken se-
riously	or	simply	frustrate,	bore,	annoy	or	irritate.	At	an	extreme	they	will	be	imper-
ceptible, at least, according to dominant regimes (and codes) of visuality (hence the 
importance of learning to see, or, which amounts to the same thing, of attending to 
our own particular production of subjectivity). It is the edges of our ‘understanding’ 
that are important in this sense – this is where everything happens.
The importance of these kinds of practices is then that they offer something dif-
ferent to the what-already-is. This might be simply a diversion – or, at any rate, dis-
missed as one, as not part of the dominant code (or, apparently, a threat to it), hence, 
ultimately unimportant. But in other cases, and for different subjects, they are points 
of inspiration and radical difference that might then be developed and mobilized into 
a different way of being in the world (and with this foreshadow a different commu-
nity yet-to-come). Here an art practice presents something more germinal than para-
sitic. It can be the seed of something genuinely new. In an increasingly homogenized 
and homogenizing neoliberal present that offers only more of the same – a present 
that overcodes all options – these points of difference can themselves become poli-
tically charged. Indeed, when the political scene offers no new models, art steps up. 
Here,	in	fact,	it	might	be	less	a	case	of	already	worked	out	models	than	experimental	
probes, affective scenes, proto-subjectivities, and such like. Art can generate the feel 
of something different in this sense.
But to construct a genuinely new form of coding one needs material, hence, also in 
this	task,	the	importance	of	the	scrambling	of	already-existing	code	or	the	importing	
of more alien code from elsewhere (outside of typical art-world culture) ... at least as 
a	first	step.	This	is	a	mixing	that	is	both	spatial	and	temporal	in	nature	(more	on	this	
in a moment). Ultimately an art practice can then take off from this hybridity and 
begin	to	work	on	its	own	terms,	producing	its	own	(autonomous)	coding.	For	examp-
le, it might throw up images or forms that seem to come from a ‘somewhere else’, 
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but that also have some kind of strange relevance to the world as-it-is. Untimely 
images. It might also begin to recycle and re-use its own motifs, nesting one set of 
fictions	within	another,	so	as	to	produce	a	certain	complexity	–	a	density	even.	The	
idea that a practice might involve moves in a game for which one does not know the 
exact	rules	echoes	this	logic	of	strangeness	and	autopoietic	functioning.
2. Fictioning: Synchronic and Diachronic Operations
    (or, speaking back and speaking in tongues)
One	way	of	articulating	this	particular	logic	of	art	practice	is	as	a	‘fictioning’:	the	
production of untimely images – that speak back to their producer (1); and the lay-
ering	of	motifs	to	produce	an	accretion	of	sorts,	resulting	in	an	opacity	(2).
(1)	As	far	as	the	first	of	these	goes,	it	might	be	that	a	practice	just	presents	the	 
result:	 the	final	 image	(or	 images).	Here	the	relative	strangeness	of	 the	image	(its	
difference	to	the	what-already-is)	is	foregrounded.	On	the	other	hand,	it	might	lay	
out the procedure and protocols that allow this image to step forth from its dark 
background. Indeed, it might be that a practice stages this event, or even that practice 
is a name for it (and it is in this last sense that art practice is a very particular type 
of research programme). Performance can involve what we might call this magical 
function:	the	summoning	forth	of	something	hitherto	unknown	and	unseen.	Colla-
boration,	or	more	specifically,	collectivity	–	a	scene	of	some	kind	–	is	also	crucial	
for this operation. How else can one make something that is of one but not of one 
at the same time? That is intended but produces the unintended? For ‘I’ is indeed a 
stranger,	but	it	is	only	through	a	specific	practice	that	this	stranger	can	foreground	
itself from the habitual and familiar. It should be pointed out here that collectivity 
(again, a scene) need not involve more than a single individual. As Deleuze and 
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Guattari	 remark	at	 the	beginning	of	A Thousand Plateaus, we are always already 
more than one.3 
Art speaks back in this sense. It is both cleverer and dumber than its progenitors. 
This is not to evacuate the subject from the picture. Indeed, such art – like all art – is 
made for subjects (images and objects made ‘for’ other images and objects may be 
many things, but art is not one of them – although I will suggest a caveat to this point 
in	a	moment).	Nevertheless	there	is	something	about	this	fictioning	–	this	production	
of	something	non-subject	–	that	is	specifically	object-orientated,	to	use	the	current	
valence.	It	is	as	if	the	goal	here	is	to	extract	a	certain	objectness	(something	non-
human) from an all-too-human subject.
This	is	the	synchronic	aspect	of	fictioning.
(2)	In	terms	of	the	second	aspect,	time	itself	becomes	a	material	insofar	as	the	
accretion happens through time, across a work, or across multiple works. It might 
be that this passage is imperceptible, only able to be tracked by the recurrence of 
the motifs – or (in Plastique Fantastique’s case) avatars – that appear, disappear 
then reappear (perhaps in a different form), each with their own operating logics, 
their own speeds (and slownesses). An art practice has a certain duration in this 
sense – or even multiple durations. A kind of aesthetic ecology is produced which 
means the practice has more in common with a series, or again, a scene, than with an 
object per se.
The elements of an art practice can travel in this sense. Fragments of previous 
codes	(and	characters)	make	a	re-entry,	spliced	with	other	more	recent	experiments.	
Such work is a palimpsest even when it looks relatively simple. Another way of ar-
ticulating	this	logic	is	that	a	practice	nests	its	own	fictions	within	itself.	This	kind	of	
temporal density comes from the fact that any given moment – any given image of 
the	practice	that	we	see	–	is	an	extraction	from	a	process,	even	a	narrative	(at	least	
of a kind), that goes from the depths of the past of the work towards a future that the 
work itself helps to bring about (a practice can be a backward-hurled fragment of a 
future world in this sense).
This	is	the	diachronic	aspect	of	fictioning.
Art	 is	simple	but	complex	in	this	sense.	It	 inserts	 itself	 into	a	variety	of	regis-
ters (signifying and asignifying) but it also refers to itself (it is, as it were, inward 
looking).	Or,	more	accurately,	it	works	on	itself	...	follows	lines	of	enquiry,	repeats	
certain moments, accelerates some motifs ... slows others down ... in so doing, art 
itself constitutes a world – its own world (as well as the terms in which it may be 
‘understood’). And this, ultimately, is its power.
3	 “The	two	of	us	wrote	Anti-Oedipus	together.	Since	each	of	us	were	several,	there	was	already	quite	 
	 a	crowd”	(Deleuze/Guattari	1988,	1).
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3. From Collapsing Worlds to Points of Collapse (or, a holding pattern of 
    minimum consistency)
In	a	way,	both	of	the	above	modes	of	fictioning	involve	a	layering.	Again,	the	first	is	
spatial, the second temporal. It is this spatio-temporal density – which results in the 
production of a different space-time – that constitutes art when it is a practice rather 
than simply the production of a commodity (the production of untimely images 
does share with the commodity form a certain magical character – this is a kind of 
‘counter-sorcery’ pitched against the phantasmagoria of the commodity).
The increasing availability and relative affordability of digital imaging and edi-
ting	technology	means	that	there	is	now	the	possibility	of	a	more	accelerated	mixing	
of different temporal and spatial worlds and, as such, of increasing this density – 
and, with it, producing ever stranger spatialities and temporalities. Such technology 
also allows its user to alter the speeds of the different images and sequences being 
deployed. This might mean the introduction of a different character (or a different 
speed) into a different scene that has its own duration, or, indeed, the insertion of one 
scene into another. In this strange dream-time a virtual ‘third thing’ is introduced bet-
ween the two. A no-place and a no-time. An ‘erewhon’ when and where other things 
become possible. This is also an indirect answer to the ever present ‘now’ of commo-
dity culture insofar as it often involves recourse to a recent past (alongside its ima-
gined futures) – a line to that which has been too easily and eagerly forgotten in the 
ever increasing and insatiable desire for the apparently new (it is this recalling of a 
past in a future-to-come that marks out some of the best recent digital art practices).4
This collapsing of hitherto separate worlds – and the concomitant production of 
a	‘new’	landscape,	a	new	platform	for	dreaming	–	is	another	definition	of	fictioning,	
4	 This	is	the	subject	of	a	further	parallel	essay-in-progress	on	“Myth-Science	as	Residual	Culture	and	 
	 Magical	Thinking”.
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especially	when	it	is	no	longer	clear	where	the	fiction	itself	ends	and	so-called	reality	
begins	(or	where	reality	ends	and	the	fiction	begins).	Fictioning	inserts	itself	into	the	
real in this sense – into the world as-it-is (indeed, it collapses the so-called real and 
the	fictional),	but,	in	so	doing,	it	necessarily	augments	and,	indeed,	changes	our	rea-
lity (not least as, again, it summons an audience that is appropriate and adequate to 
it).5	This	is	fictioning	as	mythopoeisis:	the	imaginative	transformation	of	the	world	
through	fiction.
This	particular	sense	of	fictioning	dovetails	with	the	idea	of	post-internet	art,	or	
art that is made from and for the web of images that now doubles – and troubles – our 
own world of things. As such it might be said that the collapsing worlds we produce 
have their own life outside of our control, or, indeed, anyone else’s. Ultimately, they 
do not rely on being seen to operate as agents (after all, who, nowadays, can see all 
the images that are generated?). They are already in contact and ‘communication’ 
with	 image-worlds	 that	are	 increasingly	not	of	human	generation.	Once	again	 the	
question here is whether such worlds that operate divorced from any kind of subject 
can be called art (who, after all, is there to call them anything?). It is perhaps more 
accurate to say that they become art when confronted by an interlocutor (although 
this will not necessarily be a ‘human’ in the sense of a particular historical diagram, 
with	an	inside	and	outside,	a	centered	‘self’,	and	so	on.	More	on	this	other	subject	
in a moment).
Is	art	the	only	place	where	we	find	this	logic	of	collapsing	worlds?	Or,	indeed,	
the spatial and temporal layering I have just laid out? Certainly other aspects of 
culture utilize the latter, albeit only partially and somewhat reductively. Fashion, 
for	example	(as	spatial	layering),	or	the	mini-series	(as	a	form	that	involves	longer	
durations	than	the	typical	film	or,	indeed,	the	novel).	In	terms	of	collapsing	worlds	
we need only look at the post-continuity cuts of recent pop videos (but also note that 
a strange continuity is maintained ‘behind’ the videos themselves in the ‘lives’ of the 
celebrities	as	narrated	on-line	and	on	TV).	This	amounts	to	saying	that	our	particular	
(and,	as	it	were,	dominant)	world	(or	let	us	now	give	it	its	other	name:	capitalism)	
generates	its	own	experiments	outside	of	art	–	experiments	that	in	some	senses	doub-
le art’s own probe heads.
But in art, the processes that I have just outlined are accentuated beyond the rea-
sonable.	Art	is	like	a	joke	pushed	to	an	extreme	in	this	sense.	From	a	certain	perspec-
tive it is like an ongoing absurd repetition, a gesture beyond the logics of the market. 
5	 The	concept	of	 ‘hyperstition’	as	developed	by	Nick	Land	(and	 the	Cybernetic	Culture	Research	 
	 Unit	(Ccru))	might	be	usefully	brought	to	bear	here	insofar	as	it	likewise	points	to	elements	of	fiction 
	 making	themselves	real.	Alex	Williams,	co-writer	of	the	“Manifesto	for	Accelerationist	Politics”,	 
 provides a useful gloss on this in his essay on accelerationist aesthetics in which hyperstition is 
	 defined	as	“narratives	able	to	effectuate	their	own	reality	through	the	workings	of	feedback	loops,	 
	 generating	new	sociopolitical	attractors”	 (Williams	2013,	9).	 It	 seems	 to	me	 that	art	practice	as	 
	 fictioning	–	as	I	have	been	defining	it	–	involves	both	a	narrative	function	(at	least	of	a	sort)	and	‘so- 
 ciopolitical attractors’ (untimely images) generated by the latter, but also generative of them in 
 turn. For more on Land and Ccru’s concept of hyperstition (in relation to myth-science) see 
	 O’Sullivan	2016b.
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Indeed, art does not have to maintain even a modicum of good/common sense in this 
respect – or, to say it again, is not necessarily involved in the production of typical 
knowledge.
Crucially, with art, this often means that something unrecognizable, often acci-
dental,	is	introduced	into	the	mix.	Chances	can	be	taken	–	after	all,	there	is	no	au-
dience	to	please,	except	for	the	very	specific	audience	that	is	looking	for	something	
that does not please them (at least, as they are presently constituted). This is the in-
troduction of something random, something that is, as it were, unwelcome and spoils 
any	ready-made	and	too-neat	schema	or	logic.	It	is	the	introduction	–	or	excavation	
– of rupture, a point of collapse.
In this sense the art practice is not, ultimately, simply the production of subjec-
tivity (at least when this is tethered to dominant regimes of subjectivation). It is not 
therapeutic,	however	 that	might	be	defined.	A	practice	certainly	needs	a	 sense	of	
cohesion, but it also needs these points of collapse – or else it risks just presenting 
more-of-the-same. I have written about this – with David Burrows – at more length 
and	in	relation	 to	Guattari	and	Jacques	Lacan	elsewhere	(see	Burrows/O’Sullivan	
2014).	Suffice	 to	 say	here	 that	an	art	practice	might	be	a	kind	of	holding	pattern	
– maintaining a minimum consistency – for these points of collapse. Indeed, this 
might,	again,	be	a	definition	of	fictioning:	the	production	of	a	myth	of	some	kind	that	
binds the holes and presents and pitches them to an audience.
Simon	O’Sullivan,	Myth-Science	and	the	Fictioning	of	Reality	 87
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 1/13/17 11:52 PM
88	 Paragrana	25	(2016)	2
4. Conclusion: Reclaiming the Unconscious 
    (or, a message not to you but to something ‘within’ you)
It is not news to say that Capital has colonized time as well as space, but this needs 
also to be thought in terms of more imaginary registers, that is to say, not just within 
reality per se with its typical spaces, places, times and durations, but also in terms 
of our unconscious worlds. As has also been remarked often enough, the failure of 
politics is also the failure of the imagination. Capital, we might say, has increasingly 
co-opted even our dream worlds – that repository of images that give us a life beyond 
the plane of matter.
Indeed, this unconscious – understood in a Bergsonian sense (as a virtual reser-
voir that subsists but that is habitually masked by more utilitarian and pragmatic 
interests)	–	is	being	colonized	by	commodity	culture,	and	not	least	by	Web	2.0	and	
its	logics.	Facebook	and	Twitter	and	all	the	other	filtering	super-nodes	of	a	once	wild	
– and un-enclosed – web offer up a restricted repository of images (and especially in-
terfaces), ever available, seemingly varied, but, in fact, often just more-of-the-same. 
The result of this is not only a poverty in the sense of the homogenization performed 
by	these	image-banks,	but	also	an	alienation:	we	become	the	spectators	of	our	own	
subjection insofar as these images and interfaces are not of us, or, at least, are only 
of a part of us (that part which can be represented by such images and their attendant 
algorithms). This is not to say that creativity is impossible here. Indeed, as I sugges-
ted above, many of the most interesting post-internet practices concern themselves 
with the digital, and, at the sharp end, the algorithmic. It is to say, precisely, that 
social	media	filters	our	experiences,	flattens	subjective	modellings	and,	ultimately,	
is concerned more with markets and consumers than with difference and creativity.
Another	way	of	thinking	about	the	fictioning	function	of	art	practice	is	then	as	a	
counter to some of these logics – as the reclaiming and unleashing of this uncons-
cious. Art practice – at least as I have attempted to articulate it here – can produce 
new images and sequences – new myths and new dream worlds. Again, this is not 
simply	to	refuse	or	resist	the	existing	conditions.	In	fact,	it	might	well	mean	plugging	
in	to	the	productive	and	generative	aspects	of	capitalism	–	the	deterritorialized	flows	
that are typically and subsequently reterritorialized, siphoned off. Following Deleuze 
and	Guattari’s	Anti-Oedipus, such art might be said to ‘accelerate the process’ (De-
leuze/Guattari	1984,	240).6 
An	 important	 aspect	 of	fictioning,	 in	 this	 sense,	 is	 participation	 in	 the	fiction.	
This does not necessarily mean that an audience/spectator is invited into the work 
– often an artwork is inhospitable (it refuses to give ground). But it does mean that 
the	produced	fiction	offers	something.	It	is	from	and	for	a	collectivity	(again,	even	if	
this is just an individual) – albeit one that is masked by more typical (atomized and 
hyper-individualized) subjectivity.
6	 In	terms	of	the	connections	–	and	differences	–	between	these	claims	for	art	practice	and	the	Prome- 
 thean impulse as mapped out by accelerationist writers such as Ray Brassier and Reza Negarestani 
	 see	O’Sullivan	2017.
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It	is	also	in	this	sense	that	this	fictioning	performs	its	own	alienation:	alienation	from	
and for an already alienated subject (indeed, alienation is the given – the very ground 
–	of	these	practices).	Here	fictioning’s	difference	from	the	world	as-it-is	means	it	will	
alienate the subject as-it-is, but, at the same time, speak to the subject yet-to-be. It 
is a message not to you but to something within you (or, it solicits its own kind of 
audiences, which amounts to the same thing).
It	is	also	for	this	reason	that	difficulty,	complexity,	the	refusal	of	meaning,	and	
so	forth	are	not	always	the	signs	of	elitism	or	a	deliberate	mystification/obscurifica-
tion, but the sign of something that will not give ground to the world as-it-is, will 
not pander to the demand to make sense (at least, following the dominant codes of 
meaning and top-down decisions about what should have meaning). It is also, in this 
sense, that art must invent the criteria by which it is ‘understood’, which does not 
necessarily involve the register of interpretation (to follow Lyotard again, meaning 
might mean simply that we are ‘set in motion’ by the work). Every practice, if it is a 
practice, is its own genre in this sense – and, as such, to say it again, constitutes its 
own world. But that other place from where art is pitched is also a world, one whose 
very edges are now revealed by this doubling. Ultimately, an art practice maintains a 
critical function in this respect insofar as it turns away from that other myth-system 
which	it	has	revealed	as	such.	Myth-science	is	a	good	name	for	this	world-building	
– and world-breaking – technology.
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Coda: Guattari and Fabulous Images 
In	the	section	‘Genet	Regained’	in	Schizoanalytic Cartography,	Guattari	offers	ano-
ther	inflection	on	the	relation	between	fiction	and	life	–	or,	more	especially,	the	con-
nection of poetics to a politics that is itself understood as the summoning/production 
of a people.7	In	Genet’s	case,	Guattari	suggests	that	there	is	a	‘subterranean	process’	
– a kind of ur-processuality – that characterizes, but that is also prior to, the work 
and life of the author and that it is this ‘ground’ that provides a link between the two 
(a link between the clinical and the critical).
This understanding of an intimate connection between art and life suggests that 
the former should not be considered simply a representation of the latter, or indeed, 
be	simply	defined	as	a	utopian	imaging.	Although	in	his	own	solo	work	Deleuze	uses	
the	 term	fabulation	(a	concept	borrowed	from	Henri	Bergson),	Guattari	here	sug-
gests	that	Genet	does	not	so	much	offer	what	Guattari	calls	a	‘derealising	fabulation’,	
but rather ‘fabulous images’ (amongst other things) that are involved in a particular 
‘image	function’,	part	of	a	processual	praxis	that	ultimately	opens	the	reader	up	to	
new universes of reference and, consequently, the production of a new subjectivity.8 
Art	is	not	an	inert	reflection	of	the	world-as-it-is	in	this	sense,	but	a	kind	of	subjective	
technology	–	a	fictioning	–	involved	in	the	production	of	a	different	mode	of	being	
in the world.
Guattari	writes	of	Genet’s	fascination	with	the	Black	Panthers	as	an	example	of	
this	image	function:	‘the	ways	of	being	and	dressing	of	the	Black	Panthers,	which	
almost overnight change the way black people as a whole perceive the colour of their 
skin	or	the	texture	of	their	hair	for	example’	(Guattari	2013,	222).	Crucially,	Guattari	
also	suggests	that:
one	can	legitimately	broaden	this	expression	to	all	the	imaginary	formations	that,	from	this	same	
perspective,	acquire	a	particular	–	transversal	–	capacity	to	bridge	times	of	life,	existential	levels	as	
much	as	social	segments,	even	–	why	not	–	cosmic	stratifications.	(Guattari	2013,	220)
The image function of art operates as a connector between regimes, a bridge bet-
ween	different	existential	levels	of	life.	It	also	offers	up	a	point	of	inspiration	around	
which a different kind of construction can begin to occur – and, as such, attain 
7	 And	in	this	sense	Guattari’s	ideas	offer	a	compelling	supplement	to	his	and	Deleuze’s	concept	of	 
	 a	minor	literature	which	also	involves	this	address	to	a	people-yet-to-come.	See	especially	Chapter	3, 
	 “What	is	a	Minor	Literature?”	in	Deleuze/Guattari	1986,	16-27;	and,	for	a	discussion	of	the	minor	 
	 in	relation	to	contemporary	art,	Chapter	2,	“Art	and	the	Political:	Minor	Literature,	the	War	Ma- 
	 chine	and	the	Production	of	Subjectivity”,	of	O’Sullivan	2006,	69-97.	(Thanks	to	Theo	Reeves- 
	 Evison	for	first	pointing	me	towards	Guattari’s	essay	on	Genet.)
8 Deleuze discusses Bergson’s concept of fabulation (or ‘story telling’) in the last few pages of 
 Bergsonism	(Deleuze	1991,	106-112)	where	it	is	portrayed	as	a	mechanism	that	produces	an	interval	 
 within society through which ‘creative emotion’ might arise. Elsewhere, Deleuze uses the concept 
	 of	fabulation	more	specifically	in	relation	to	a	political	project	(as	bridge	between	the	critical	(work)	 
 and clinical (author)). See, as indicative, the essay ‘Literature and Life’, where Deleuze suggests 
	 that	“It	is	the	task	of	the	fabulating	function	to	invent	a	people”	(Deleuze	1997,	4).
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consistency.	Here	fiction	operates	as	the	friction	–	the	cohering	mechanism	–	for	a	
different subjectivity.
The	 first	 stage	 in	 this	 processuality	 –	 ‘modular	 crystallization’	 –	 involves	 the	
production of various images and names that collapse different universes together 
(including,	crucially,	a	shuttling	between	signifier	and	signified,	content	and	expres-
sion).	Guattari	suggests	that	this	is	somewhat	akin	to	what	Freud	writes	about	in	his	
work on jokes and on dreams. We might say it is the work of condensation.
The second stage involves the production of ‘fabulous images’ themselves, 
which	enlarge:
fields	of	virtuality,	allowing	new	Universes	of	reference	and	singular	modalities	of	expression	to	
emerge by conjugating heterogeneous voices. In two words, it is a matter of producing another real, 
correlative	to	another	subjectivity.	(Guattari	2013,	225)
These fabulous images – points of condensation that become points of conjunction 
(achieving,	it	seems	to	me,	a	certain	density)	–	operate	as	probe-heads,	experimen-
tal devices that themselves map out a different reality (‘another real’), which, as 
Guattari	suggests,	is	‘correlative	to	another	subjectivity’.
The	third	and	final	moment	is	when	these	images	themselves	become	‘existential	
operators’ – or synapses – for new kinds of enunciation whose ‘function is to pro-
duce	a	singular	temporality,	a	specific	way	of	discursivising	subjectivity’	(Guattari	
2013,	229).	This	is	when	art	becomes	what	Guattari	calls	elsewhere	a	Z-Point,	that	
operates as a point of cohesion but also (and this relates to some of my previous 
comments	about	collapse)	as	a	void	point,	a	line	to	an	Outside.9	Guattari	writes	about	
a kind of self-fashioning – or ‘self divination’ – that proceeds from these points 
(Guattari	2013,	229).
Henceforth, numen	no	longer	affixes	itself	to	the	marrow	of	images,	but	finds	itself	distilled	in	much	
more	molecular	praxes,	 if	you	will,	appropriate	for	 transforming	the	everyday	perception	of	 the	
world	and	eschatological	horizons.	(Guattari	2013,	230)
With this stage the crossing is made from art to life – or, to put this differently, there 
is a rhythm produced that crosses over the gulf. Art becomes what Foucault might 
call a technology of the self in so far as it provides a different kind of anchor point 
for a different practice of living. Indeed, here the poetic function meets the political 
one	and	art	–	as	fictioning	–	announces	and	helps	produce	a	new	subjectivity	(along-
side	a	new	relation	to	the	Outside)	against	what	William	Burroughs,	and	then	Gilles	 
Deleuze, once called Control.10 
  9 I have written at more length about these mutant nuclei and how they cohere subjectivity around 
	 themselves	in	O’Sullivan	2012,	96-103.	For	more	on	how	these	points	might	also	be	holes	to	an	 
	 Outside,	see	Burrows/O’Sullivan	2014.
10	 See	Burroughs	2014	and	Deleuze	1995.	I	go	in	to	more	detail	about	the	possible	contours	and	con- 
 cepts – from a Deleuzian perspective – of an artistic war machine that might be pitched against 
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